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THE CUBAN ARM APPARENTLY REMAINS ABOUT AS BIG AS BEFORE THE CRISIS, THE REPORT SAID, LISTING 75,000 REGULARS, 10,000 IN A MILITIA AND 100,000 IN THE FORM OF A HOME GUARD.

THE SENATORS SAID IT APPEARS THE RUSSIANS MAN THE 24 ANTIAIRCRAFT MISSILE BASES, FOUR COAST DEFENSE MISSILE SITES, A FLEET OF 12 MISSILE-ARMED KOFAR PATROL CRAFT AND THE HEAVIEST OF TANKS, ARTILLERY AND OTHER GEAR.

THEY QUOTED INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES THAT THE SOVIET AIR FORCE HAS SOME 42 MODERN, SUPERSONIC MIG-21 JET FIGHTERS IN CUBA.

"IT IS CONCEDED THAT THE COMBINED SOVIET AND CUBAN FORCES NOW IN THE ISLAND ARE QUITE POWERFUL DEFENSIVELY AND COULD OFFER SEVERE OPPOSITION TO ANY ATTACK," THE REPORT SAID.

"THEY ARE ADMITTEDLY CAPABLE OF SUPPRESSING ANY INTERNAL REBELLION OR REVOLT MOUNTED WITHOUT EXTERNAL SUPPORT, AND IT IS CLEAR THAT AN INVASION FROM WITHOUT, TO HAVE A FAIR CHANCE OF SUCCESS, WOULD REQUIRE LARGE FORCES, EXTENSIVE SEA-BORNE LANDING EFFORTS AND ADEQUATE AIR COVER."

THE INTELLIGENCE CHIEFS DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE COMMUNIST FORCES IN CUBA PRESENT "A DIRECT AGGRESSIVE MILITARY THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES OR LATIN AMERICA," THE SENATORS SAID.

BUT THEY MADE PLAIN THEY ARE NOT READY TO GO ALONG ALL THE WAY ON THIS, SAYING:

"STRATEGIC WEAPONS MAY OR MAY NOT BE NOW IN CUBA. WE CAN REACH NO CONCLUSION ON THIS BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE."

THE REPORT MADE NO DETAILED RECOMMENDATIONS BUT SAID "OUR GENERAL RECOMMENDATION AT THIS TIME IS THAT AN ALERT VIGILANCE BE MAINTAINED OVER ALL ACTIVITIES TAKING PLACE IN CUBA."

SPEAKING FOR HIMSELF, SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIRMAN JOHN STENNIS, D-MISS., TOLD THE SENATE:

"THE NO. 1 PRIORITY OF OUR NATIONAL AND FOREIGN POLICY SHOULD AND MUST BE THE COMPLETE REMOVAL OF ALL RUSSIANS FROM CUBA AND THE ADOPTION OF A FIRM AND HARD LINE WHICH WILL RID OUR HEMISPHERE OF THIS THREAT ONCE AND FOR ALL."

SEN. STROM THURMOND, D-S. C., A MEMBER OF THE GROUP, CALLED FOR AN ULTIMATUM TO RUSSIA TO FORCE A PULLOUT OF ALL SOVIET FORCES FROM CUBA.

IF RUSSIA REFUSES, THURMOND SAID, THE UNITED STATES SHOULD BREAK DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA AND, IF NECESSARY, IMPOSE "A NAVAL AND AIR BLOCKADE OF CUBA TO BRING THE SOVIETS TO THEIR KNEES."

SHOULD A BLOCKADE BE INEFFECTIVE, THURMOND SAID, "WE SHOULD TURN THIS MATTER OVER TO THE MILITARY IN ORDER THAT THE SOVIETS MAY BE FORCED OUT OF CUBA."

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SEN. STROM THURMOND, D-S. C., A SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBER, AGREED WITH STENNIS THAT "WE CANNOT PERMIT THE COMMUNISTS TO REMAIN IN CUBA." THURMOND SAID THE U. S. SHOULD DEMAND THAT THE SOVIET UNION REMOVE ALL ITS FORCES AND EQUIPMENT "BY A FIXED DATE" AND IF THEY STILL REMAIN, "WE SHOULD CANCEL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND THE OAS (ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES) SHOULD ALSO DO THIS."

THAT, THURMOND SAID, MIGHT FORCE PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV TO CHANGE HIS MIND. BUT "IF THIS FAILS, WE SHOULD APPLY A NAVAL AND AIR BLOCKADE TO BRING THE SOVIETS TO THEIR KNEES" IN CUBA, THURMOND SAID.

IF THE BLOCKADE DOES NOT DO THE JOB, THURMOND SAID, "WE SHOULD TURN THE MATTER OVER TO THE MILITARY."

ANOTHER SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBER, SEN. HENRY M. JACKSON, D-WASH., SAID THE SUBCOMMITTEE'S SECRET HEARINGS SHOWED THAT CIA DIRECTOR JOHN A. MCCOONE "INTUITIVELY" PREDICTED IN LATE JULY OR EARLY AUGUST THAT THE SOVIETS WERE BRINGING IN STRATEGIC MISSILES.

JACKSON SAID MCCOONE WAS THE ONLY INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL THAT "HAD COME TO THIS CONCLUSION IN EARLY AUGUST." HE SAID MCCOONE TOLD THE SUBCOMMITTEE IN A MARCH 12 HEARING THAT HE HAD NO "FIRM EVIDENCE" IN AUGUST BUT "INTUITIVELY, I COULD REACH NO OTHER CONCLUSION."

SEN. STUART SIMMONS, D-MO., ALSO PRAISED MCCOONE AND SAID ANY FAILURE TO FOLLOW THROUGH ON MCCOONE'S CONCLUSION WAS BECAUSE IT WAS NOT RELAYED TO OTHER DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES.

SEN. BARRY M. GOLDWATER, R-ARIZ., SAID HE FELT THAT ON THE WHOLE THE CIA "DEVELOPED A GOOD INTELLIGENCE PACKAGE" IN THE CUBA SITUATION BUT "THERE WAS AN ERROR IN JUDGMENT AT SOME PLACE."

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